CRCB Nonprofit ltd

EU Legislative Interests

In connection with EU activities, the Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB) primarily investigates corruption in EU member states using objective, contract-level data rather than perception-based indicators. Our work combines quantitative methods (mathematical and statistical analysis of public procurement contracts) with qualitative approaches (case studies and interviews). The most important findings—relevant for the EU legislative process and the design of more effective anti-corruption policies—can be summarized as follows: 1. Institutional convergence in new and Southern EU member states In one study, we assessed institutional convergence in the new EU member states and four Southern European countries using complex micro-level data on public procurement. Drawing on over 3.6 million contract-level observations from the EU TED database (2006–2018), we treated the control of corruption risk as a proxy for institutional quality, with high-performing countries serving as benchmarks. Our results partly confirm earlier research on the weak performance of Southern EU member states, but also reveal substantial differences among the new member states. Slovakia, Estonia, and Lithuania achieved significant institutional convergence, now displaying a relatively high capacity to control corruption risks. Poland showed partial convergence, though its institutional quality remains moderate, while Latvia has maintained a steady—though not outstanding—performance. In contrast, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania demonstrated weak or only moderate institutional quality, with limited convergence. Slovenia and Bulgaria exhibited the poorest outcomes, diverging from the benchmark group. These findings underscore that national-level institutional reforms are indispensable, and while EU policies can promote such reforms, they are not sufficient on their own to ensure convergence. 2. EU subsidies and corruption risk In another study, we examined the relationship between EU subsidies and corruption risk in public procurement from 2007 to 2023. The results show that, even after controlling for procedure type, contract value, sector, and other characteristics, EU-funded contracts are consistently associated with higher levels of corruption risk than nationally funded ones. This holds for both traditional corruption risk indicators (e.g., the share of non-competitive awards) and alternative measures designed to capture institutional vulnerabilities. These results imply that the European Commission must strengthen monitoring and oversight of EU-funded procurement across all member states, including those traditionally regarded as less corruption-prone. 3. EU funds and the consolidation of Orbán’s kleptocracy A third study focused on Hungary, examining whether and to what extent EU taxpayers contributed to the consolidation of Viktor Orbán’s kleptocratic regime between 2011 and 2023. Using data on 340,000 Hungarian public procurement contracts, we analyzed both the contracts awarded to thirteen politically connected businessmen and those concluded without competitive bidding. Within EU-financed contracts, the combined net value awarded to the thirteen crony companies and through non-competitive awards totaled €19.3 billion during 2011–2023. Based on our estimation, the EU taxpayers may have involuntarily supported Orbán’s kleptocracy with €3.2–5.5 billion. The EU and Hungarian taxpayers contributed to Orbán’s kleptocratic system in an approximate ratio of 1:3 to 2:3. Importantly, electoral cycles were clearly reflected in the annual volume of n the annual volume of kleptocratic rents derived from EU funds, offering direct empirical evidence that EU financial transfers were systematically exploited to consolidate political power. These results provide robust evidence for the European Commission and the European Parliament to adopt more decisive measures to curb the misuse of EU funds.

Communication Activities

We publish all our research results on our website, making them accessible to everyone. The following may be of interest to EU institutions. Tóth, I. J. (2025). EU Taxpayers’ Contribution to Building the Orbán Kleptocracy. CRCB Research Notes, 2025:2, CRCB. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3704 Tóth, I, J. (2024). Corruption Risk of EU-Funded Contracts in the EU 2007-2023. CRCB Working Papers: 2024:1, CRCB. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3577 Tóth, I. J. (2024). Two Communication Companies in the Hungarian Public Procurement Market 2012-2023. CRCB Research Notes: 2024:1, CRCB. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3530 CRCB. (2023). The New Trends of Corruption Risk in Hungarian Public Procurement from January 1998 to July 2023, https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3450 CRCB. (2023): Fourteen Graphs and Two Tables on the New Trends of Corruption Risk in the Hungarian Public Procurement 2005-2022. CRCB Statistical Quick Report 2023:1, https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3400 Vida, M., Matuz, A., and Tóth, I. J. (2023). White Elephants in Hungary. Lessons of some EU-funded projects – Case studies. CRCB Research Notes: 2023:1, Budapest: CRCB. Research Notes 2023:1 https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3338 CRCB. (2023). Hungary: Corruption risk in public procurement from 2005 to 2022. Six figures on the Hungarian corruption and competition in public procurement. Budapest: CRCB. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3225 Tóth, I. J. and Hajdu, M. (2017). Intensity of Competition, Corruption Risks, and Price Distortion in the Hungarian Public Procurement – 2009-2016. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2017:2, CRCB, Budapest. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=1229 CRCB. (2014). The Corruption Risks of the Nuclear Power Plants: What can we expect in case of Paks II? Budapest: CRCB. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=738 Fazekas, M. – Chvalkovska, J. – Skuhrovec, J. – Tóth, I. J. – King L. P. (2013). Are EU funds a corruption risk? The impact of EU funds on grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2013:03. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=278 In addition to the above activities, we respond positively to requests from the international press. We have assisted Reuters, The New York Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Bloomberg, El País, Le Monde, Gazeta Wyborcza, Parameter.sk, Polityka, Vox.com, Financial Times, The Times, Foreign Policy, and oko.press in their work. See: https://www.crcb.eu/?page_id=1438 As a think tank, we place strong emphasis on fostering constructive relationships with Hungarian civil society organizations engaged in anti-corruption efforts (such as K-Monitor and Transparency International Hungary), independent investigative media outlets (including Direkt36 and Átlátszó), as well as research institutions and think tanks (e.g., the Budapest Institute and the Institute of Public Finance; Centre for Peace Studies).

Interests Represented

Does not represent commercial interests

Member Of

The CRCB has no permanent sponsors. It does not belong to any umbrella organization. It has no subsidiaries, affiliated companies, or memberships in any other organizations. The CRCB has worked with the following organizations on joint projects: Átlátszó, Budapest Institute (in Hungary), Institute of Public Finance (in Poland), and Centre for Peace Studies (in Croatia).

Organisation Members

We have no affiliated companies or entities. Most CRCB staff work on our projects voluntarily or on a project-by-project basis under contract. https://www.crcb.eu/?page_id=173 Miklós Hajdu Miklós Hajdu is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at Corvinus University of Budapest, where he obtained his PhD in sociology. His research primarily focuses on economic sociology and deviant behaviors. One key topic of interest to him at the intersection of these broader areas is corruption, an issue he has been studying since 2015, primarily from the perspective of European Funds, cronyism, and democratic backsliding in Hungary. Beyond his university work, Miklós also participates in research projects at the Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB), further deepening his expertise on corruption risks, particularly in the area of public procurement. More recently, his research agenda has expanded to include the study of protests and social movements. He is equally concerned with the methodological challenges of social research and has expertise in both qualitative and quantitative methods, as represented in his teaching portfolio. István János Tóth István János Tóth is an Associate Professor at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics of Eötvös Loránd University (formerly the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), and Managing Director of the Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB). He graduated from Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest in 1984 and pursued further studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris between 1990 and 1991. He holds master’s degrees in economics and sociology and earned his Ph.D. in economics from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1998. His primary research interests include corruption, economic institutions, and good governance. He has also served as an expert for international organizations, including the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European Commission. Márton Vida Márton Vida earned his BSc degree from CEU in 2025. He is currently studying at the Paris Institute of Political Studies (SciencesPo).

Additional Information

In 2024, the CRCB was unable to raise as many donations as usual.